New Delhi's next crisis looming on it's other border Foreign policy pivot in Bangladesh

In June 2017, a tense 73-day standoff unfolded between Indian and Chinese troops on Bhutan’s Doklam plateau sparked by China’s attempt to build a road near India’s strategically vital Siliguri Corridor—a narrow strip of land between Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal that links mainland India to its seven northeastern states. The incident underscored just how precariously India’s access to the northeast depends on geography—and the cooperation of its neighbours. That same vulnerability has returned to the spotlight, not due to Chinese moves, but because of a sharp shift in neighbour Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

In a matter of months, India’s once-close relationship with Bangladesh has unravelled, giving way to mistrust, diplomatic sparring, and high-stakes recalibration. According to an article by Foreign Policy, Dhaka’s new leadership has begun actively courting China and Pakistan since the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina last August, which is leaving New Delhi increasingly sidelined.

This shift is especially troubling for India as it grapples with the fallout of the latest clash with Pakistan. The prospect of Bangladesh aligning with India’s two main adversaries—geographically situated on opposite flanks—raises deep strategic concerns.

Yet this diplomatic drift is not the result of an orchestrated anti-India alliance. Rather, it is largely self-inflicted. India’s steadfast backing of Hasina’s increasingly autocratic rule, combined with the rise of Hindu nationalism under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, alienated many Bangladeshis. In focusing on immediate security interests and domestic political gains, New Delhi overlooked the importance of democratic engagement and regional goodwill. The result: diminished influence in Dhaka and a neighbour now looking elsewhere for strategic partnerships.

Since the ouster of long-time Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, India has lost its privileged access in Dhaka. Under interim leader Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh is tilting toward China and Pakistan.

Yunus, during a high-profile visit to China, explicitly emphasized Bangladesh’s geographic leverage, noting India’s dependence on access through Bangladesh for its northeast. Beijing responded warmly, offering Bangladesh full duty-free access to Chinese markets and pledging $2.1 billion in funding, along with military and infrastructure cooperation. Yunus’s government has also invited China to expand its involvement in the Mongla port and reportedly offered Pakistan a base at Lalmonirhat, near the Siliguri Corridor. These moves underline Dhaka’s growing strategic ties with India’s rivals.

This realignment, however, stems less from Chinese or Pakistani manipulation and more from India’s own policy failures. For nearly two decades, India bet heavily on Hasina, providing unwavering support to her increasingly authoritarian regime. Her government cooperated closely with India on counterinsurgency and transit issues but grew unpopular at home due to repression and electoral manipulation. India, focused on short-term gains, ignored growing anti-India sentiment among Bangladeshis who viewed New Delhi as complicit in supporting autocracy.

The rise of Hindu nationalism in India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP has further alienated Bangladesh. The 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act, which excluded Muslims from fast-track Indian citizenship, was seen as targeting Bangladeshis and sparked backlash. Modi’s 2021 visit to Bangladesh triggered violent protests, and inflammatory statements by BJP leaders have only worsened perceptions. These developments have convinced many in Dhaka that India no longer respects or values its Muslim-majority neighbor.

Yunus’s foreign policy shift reflects both a reaction to India’s perceived disrespect and an effort to assert Bangladesh’s independence. His open discussion of India’s dependence on the Siliguri Corridor, particularly while in Beijing, was seen as provocative in New Delhi. Indian military leaders, including former Army Chief Gen. M.M. Naravane, have long warned about Chinese encroachment near the corridor, and India’s 2017 intervention in Doklam was driven by fears of exactly this scenario.

India’s frustration was evident during a tense meeting between Modi and Yunus at a regional summit in Bangkok. The two leaders reiterated grievances instead of finding common ground. Disagreements over Hasina’s extradition, minority protection, and mutual accusations further widened the rift. India continues to raise concerns about attacks on Hindus in post-Hasina Bangladesh—sometimes based on unverified claims—while Dhaka has begun calling out violence against Muslims in India.

For New Delhi, the unraveling of its relationship with Bangladesh is a cautionary tale. Strategic influence cannot be sustained through transactional diplomacy alone. India now faces the hard task of rebuilding trust, rebalancing its neighborhood policy, and addressing domestic narratives that alienate key regional partners.

By Nazrin Sadigova