Mystery assault on Russian base in Syria fuels speculation over regional tensions PHOTO

Several days have elapsed since an armed assault targeted the Russian Khmeimim airbase on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, yet neither Moscow nor Damascus has issued any official comment or clarification regarding the incident.

While the absence of public statements leaves many questions unanswered, it remains plausible that discreet high-level communications between Russian and Syrian officials have taken place to address the attack, the status of Russian military installations in Syria, and broader bilateral concerns, Caliber.Az reports, citing Syrian media.

According to reports circulated on social media, the Khmeimim airbase, located near Latakia, came under attack on the morning of May 20, 2025. The assailants—estimated to number between four and five—are believed to be militants of Uzbek origin. Intriguingly, these accounts assert that the attackers opposed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

The ensuing firefight resulted in the deaths of three to four attackers, while one reportedly escaped. Russian forces allegedly targeted the fleeing militant with an anti-tank missile, though his fate remains uncertain. Two Russian servicemen were killed, and several others were wounded in the clash.

Numerous analysts quickly associated the attack with recent positive developments in relations between Damascus and Western nations. They recalled that the European Union had made Russia’s complete withdrawal from Syria a precondition for lifting sanctions and normalizing ties with the Syrian government. From this perspective, the assault on Khmeimim may be interpreted as a deliberate “message” aimed at compelling Russia to withdraw its forces.

However, these commentators did not identify which entity orchestrated the attack or why this particular method was chosen to convey such a message.

Contrasting analyses challenge the above interpretation. Observers note that US President Donald Trump, at no point before, during, or after announcing the lifting of sanctions on Syria, mentioned the Russian military presence as a factor in policy considerations.

Under the current US administration, Russia’s military foothold along Syria’s Mediterranean coast appears to garner limited concern or attention. Similarly, although the European Union’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas had stipulated Russian withdrawal as a prerequisite for cooperation with the new Syrian leadership, the EU subsequently lifted sanctions without reaffirming this condition. This shift indicates that, at present, the Russian military presence in Syria is not a primary concern for European policymakers, who seem to be prioritizing economic interests and human rights issues in their initial engagement with Syria.

The stance of the newly established Syrian authorities toward relations with Russia and the future of Russian bases along the Syrian coast has been openly articulated by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly commander of military operations during Syria’s liberation battles. Al-Sharaa acknowledged that Damascus had conveyed, via intermediaries, that strikes against Russian bases were possible but emphasized a preference for dialogue to foster a new bilateral relationship. He stressed that the Syrian administration seeks to build and restore strategic relations with Russia grounded in Syrian sovereignty, security, and independent decision-making. On the issue of Russian bases, Syrian officials have expressed a desire for direct discussions with Moscow.

This suggests that the Syrian leadership does not require indirect or violent signals to communicate its position regarding the bases. Established communication channels with Moscow are available for conveying decisions and initiating negotiations without exacerbating tensions.

It is both possible and probable that following the attack, Russian and Syrian leaders engaged in confidential consultations—either through diplomatic channels or via their defence ministries—to address the incident without public disclosure. Such discretion may be intended to avoid provoking public controversies or political fallout that could undermine ongoing efforts to recalibrate bilateral relations, particularly in light of unresolved issues stemming from Syria’s prior regime and Russia’s historical support.

This would not be unprecedented; for instance, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Ankara in late February 2025 without prior announcement. Lavrov himself later confirmed the meeting.

To date, the Khmeimim attack has not visibly affected Moscow-Damascus relations or altered the status of Russian military facilities in Syria. Some Russian experts interpret the assault as a targeted message directed at Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa.

In a commentary to Syria TV, Kirill Semenov, a member of the Russian International Affairs Council and an independent analyst of political and military issues in the Middle East, posited that the attack is more closely linked to a recent religious edict (fatwa) issued by Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, who declared al-Sharaa and his followers apostates.

Semenov highlighted growing dissatisfaction with al-Sharaa among certain factions previously integrated into the Syrian army, who accuse him of deviating from his earlier principles and from Islamic law (Sharia). Rather than confronting the president directly, these groups allegedly chose to express their dissent through an attack on the Russian base, signaling their rejection of al-Sharaa’s leadership and policies, including his approach to foreign relations.

By Vafa Guliyeva